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In a recent TICs article, Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin (JKG) [1] argue that mental 
models theory (MMT) can integrate logical and probabilistic reasoning. We argue that  
JKG make a radical revision of MMT, but to ill effect.  
This can best be seen in what they say about truth and validity (see BOX 1). Formerly 
[2, p. 651], in MMT p v q (p or q) "... is true provided that at least one of its two disjuncts is 
true; otherwise, it is false." Thus p v q is true provided that one of three possibilities is true: p 
& not-q, not-p & q, p & q. But JKG claim, "The disjunction is true provided that each of 
these three cases [p & not-q, not-p & q, p & q] is possible." But these three cases are always 
possible for jointly contingent statements: that is why they are rows of the truth table for p v 
q. JKG's new definition makes almost every disjunction true! An example of a disjunction 
that it does not make true is p v not-p. This tautology fails to be true for JKG because p & 
not-p is not possible.  
BOX 1 ABOUT HERE 
Formerly [2, p. 651] MMT agreed with classical logic that or-introduction—inferring 
p v q from p—is a valid inference, because p v q is true when p is true. JKG now claim that it 
is invalid to infer p v q from p. They again refer to the three possible cases saying, "The 
premise [p] does not establish that the second [not-p & q] and third [p & q] cases are 
possible." But again, these cases are always possible for jointly contingent statements p and 
q. Note also that, (i) if or-introduction is invalid, p and not-(p v q) are consistent, and that (ii) 
JKG continue to define consistency between statements as having at least one mental model 
in common. But clearly p and not-(p v q), which is equivalent to not-p & not-q, do not have a 
model in common. JKG must deny that people can ever commit the disjunction fallacy of 
judging that Pr(p) > Pr(p v q) [3]: responding that Pr(p) > Pr(p v q) is not a fallacy if it is 
invalid to infer p v q from p. In fact, people generally respect the p-validity of inferring p v q 
from p by responding that Pr(p) ≤ Pr(p v q) [4,5].  
We are puzzled by what JKG say about a valid inference, "In everyday reasoning, its 
premises should also be true in every case in which its conclusion is true." We have no idea 
where this use of "should" comes from. We do not know of any normative logic in which the 
premises of a valid inference "should" be true when the conclusion is true. Nor do we know 
of any experimental result supporting this claim about "everyday reasoning". 
In addition to these theoretical problems, the evidence JKG present for how MMT 
integrates logic and probability is weak. In particular, their Figure 4, which apparently 
demonstrates this integration, only shows that adjustable parameters are needed to fit MMT 
to data. But this is true for almost any cognitive theory. It does not make them probabilistic 
theories.  
Another main plank in JKG’s argument is that MMT provides a better account of 
syllogistic reasoning than the probability heuristic model (PHM) [6]. However, the meta-
analysis [7] they report comparing PHM with MMT used accuracy as a measure but did not 
allow PHM to predict no valid conclusion (NVC) responses. This move contradicts PHM in 
which NVC responses are predicted by one of its main heuristics (the max-heuristic). When 
appropriate model comparison methods are used, there is evidence that PHM provides better 
fits to the data than MMT [8]. 
According to JKG, MMT provides a better account of non-monotonicity because they 
generate explanations of an inconsistency. Such explanations can just as well be represented 
in causal Bayes nets [9,10]. But neither theory produces explanations; they only represent 
them once generated from long term memory for world knowledge.  
A further supposed advantage of MMT is that it allows kinematic models that unfold 
in time. As the representations and processes employed in their example of a kinematic MMT 
bear absolutely no relationship whatever to the representation/process pair that JKG argue 
underpins deductive/probabilistic reasoning, this supposed advantage is completely spurious.  
In summary, JKG's aim was to clarify the relationship between logic and probability. 
They certainly do not do this. Their denial that or-introduction (from p to p v q) is valid in 
MMT is critical here as many fundamental theorems of probability depend on this inference. 
By contrast, the relation between logic and probability in the New Paradigm, with its 
probability conditional, could not be closer or more precise (see BOX 1). 
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Box 1: The validity of arguments (199 WORDS + 1 Figure) 
The New Paradigm defines validity as probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference 
is p-valid precisely if the uncertainty of its conclusion (i.e., one minus the probability of the 
conclusion) cannot be greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises [1]. Probability 
theory ultimately depends on classical logic, and all classically valid inferences are p-valid. 
P-validity is also monotonic: adding premises to an inference cannot decrease the total 
uncertainty of the premises. 
JKG fail to distinguish between the logical concept of p-validity and the special use of 
this term in work on syllogisms [2], which made additional extra-logical independence 
assumptions. For the logical concept, syllogisms are p-valid precisely if they are classically 
valid deductions. 
The New Paradigm introduces a probability conditional, “”, that is undefinable in 
classical logic. Its p-valid rules of inference are a proper subset of the rules of inference for 
the material conditional, “”. The latter license inferring (p & q)  r from p  r; the former 
does not license inferring (p & q)  r from p  r. In this sense,  is non-monotonic. Figure 
1 instantiates this inference schema and provides a test of which represents the natural 
language “if.”  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
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put milk in tea  tea will taste great 
(put milk in tea & put gasoline in tea)   




put milk in tea  tea will taste great 
(put milk in tea & put gasoline in tea)   
tea will taste great 
  
"That's valid!" 
Figure 1: Are people like Ann, interpreting "if" as , or are they rather like 
Bob, interpreting "if" as ? Ask them to evaluate the argument mentioned 
in the box and see whether, like Ann, they reject it as invalid or, like Bob, 
accept it as valid. 
Ann Bob 
